As major sport, political and cultural events have become increasingly international a corresponding need has been identified for greater levels of international police and security cooperation in order to ensure their smooth running. Since the late 1990s this has been formalised at EU level by numerous initiatives, including various ‘handbooks’ that seek to provide “guidelines and inspiration” for law enforcement authorities. These provide frameworks for law enforcement policy and practice during major events, with regard to general security preparations as well as more specialised counter-terrorist and public order work. In the context of a worldwide economic boom for the security industry, the guidelines can also be seen as playing a role in encouraging the purchase, installation and use of both new and more traditional technologies by police and security forces.

A new set of guidelines published by the EU in late 2011 make up part of this work, set out in the document Protection of mass sports events with an international dimension from terrorist attacks (hereafter the new Annex or the guidelines). These are an attempt to encourage uniformity in the approach of authorities to securing major events – an effort that may lead to a high level of safety, but, judging by certain aspects of the guidelines, could also lead to severe limitations of democratic rights and civil liberties, and provide a basis for invasive and intensive policing.

The guidelines are also used – to an extent – to encourage use of EU institutions for security preparations, particularly with regard to information gathering and exchange. In this respect they can be seen as one way to try and strengthen the position of the EU as an authority to which Member States should look to for expertise and assistance, overcoming traditional bilateral relationships. Alongside the development of the guidelines in the Council, funding for Member States hosting major events – demonstrated by various examples from Poland’s co-hosting of the Euro 2012 football championships – also makes clear the increasing interest of the Commission in this area. Finally, the guidelines also provide a clear example of how cooperation between the police forces of EU Member States can lead to the creation of “best practice” documents with no democratic input whatsoever.

It is not just the venues at which major events are to be held that are perceived to be potentially subject to “threats”. The guidelines also offer advice on the monitoring and protection of critical infrastructure and “soft targets”, which include “public venues, fan zones, public viewing areas, squares, traffic and evacuation routes, [and] means of public transport.” They are “highly exposed to diverse risks and unlawful acts, including terrorist attacks.” Thus, “monitoring of these soft targets, alongside the monitoring of the competition venues, should be considered as one of the main preventative and security measures.” This should be part of a plan in which “the area surrounding sports venues” is split into “special security zones”, according to the “general rule” that “the closer to the sports venue the tighter security measures are implemented.”